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A NEW DAWN FOR MUSLIMS: 
ASSERTING THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS IN POST-9/11 AMERICA 
AMANY R. HACKING* 
INTRODUCTION 
Islam is the fastest-growing religion in America and the world.1  Many 
scholars predict that Islam will soon become the largest minority religion in the 
United States.2  The questions remaining for many Americans: Who are these 
Muslims?  Where do they fit in American society?  For many legal scholars 
and attorneys, the questions more specifically are: Where do Muslims fit in our 
American legal system?  Are their civil rights being protected in post-9/11 
America? 
In this Article, I will attempt to answer some of these questions.  First, Part 
I will provide an historical and demographic background of Muslims in 
America.  Part II will discuss post-9/11 discrimination that Muslims have 
faced, and continue to face today.  Part III will analyze several key cases that 
Muslims have brought in an effort to assert their civil rights.  Part IV will 
discuss what can be learned from this litigation, and Part V will offer a brief 
conclusion. 
I.  HISTORICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND OF MUSLIMS IN AMERICA 
Muslims in America are primarily middle class and mainstream.3  There 
are approximately 1.5 million Muslims over the age of eighteen, and 850,000 
 
* Assistant Clinical Professor of Law at Saint Louis University School of Law.  The author would 
like to thank her research assistant, John Orbe, for his assistance in the preparation of this Article, 
and her husband, James O. Hacking, III, for his tireless support and thoughtful comments. 
 1. Patricia J. Ponder, Walking a Fine Line—Religious Accommodation for an Increasingly 
Diverse Workforce, 49 FOR DEF. 32, 32 (2007); see also Council on American-Islamic Relations, 
About Islam and American Muslims, http://www.cair.com/AboutIslam/IslamBasics.aspx (last 
visited March 29, 2010). 
 2. Bilal Zaheer, Note, Accommodating Minority Religions Under Title VII: How Muslims 
Make the Case for a New Interpretation of Section 701(j), U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 498 (2007). 
 3. A Pew study found that most Muslims report that a large proportion of their closest 
friends are non-Muslim, and that there is no conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in 
a modern society. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY 
MAINSTREAM 2 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 STUDY], available at http://pewresearch.org/assets/ 
pdf/muslim-americans.pdf.  Yet, 47% of those surveyed said they think of themselves first as 
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under the age of eighteen in the United States—comprising 0.6% of the United 
States adult population.4  American Muslims are an educated group, with about 
one-half of them having attended college and earning annual incomes 
comparable with those of the general public.5  Additionally, a recent Gallup 
poll report found that American Muslim women are one of the most highly-
educated female religious groups in the United States, with only Jewish 
American women attaining higher levels of education.6  A slightly larger 
portion of Muslims has not completed college (21%) compared with the 
population at large (16%).7  The annual income reported for American 
Muslims is within two percentage points of the population at large, with 16% 
making $100,000 or more, 10% making $75,000–$99,999, 15% making 
$50,000–$74,999, 24% making $30,000–$49,999 and 35% making less than 
$30,000.8 
About 65% of adult Muslims in the United States were born in another 
country.9  Though a majority of American Muslims were born abroad, 77% are 
 
Muslims then as Americans.  Id. at 3.  See also Roberta Mann, Is Sharif’s Castle Deductible: 
Islam and the Tax Treatment of Mortgage Debt, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1139, 1142 (2009) 
(noting that “Muslim American family income roughly tracks that of the population as a whole.”). 
 4. See id. at 3, 9–10 (basing results on data from its survey and available Census Bureau 
data on immigrants’ nativity and nationality).  The survey notes that 56% of Muslim American 
adults are between the ages eighteen and thirty-nine, making the Muslim adult population in 
America substantially younger than the population at large with 40% between eighteen and thirty-
nine.  Id. at 17.  See also Mann, supra note 3, at 1142 (noting the difficulty in determining the 
precise number of American Muslims because the U.S. Census is prohibited from collecting 
religious information and citing studies that “place the Muslim population at between three and 
nine million, with an average of 6.7 million.”). 
 5. See 2007 STUDY, supra note 3, at 18.  At about half, the number of Muslim Americans 
who have attended college is lower than the number in the general public. See id. at 2, 18.  About 
one quarter (23%) of Muslim Americans have completed some college, about 22% are currently 
enrolled in college, and about 10% of Muslim Americans have undertaken graduate studies.  Id. 
at 18.  In the general public of the United States, 29% of individuals have completed some 
college, 16% have college degrees, and about 9% have had some graduate level study.  Id.  See 
also Dr. Umar F. Abd-Allah, Living Islam with Purpose, 17 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 17, 
18 n.2 (2008) (describing American Muslims as “one of the most educated and prosperous 
Muslim communities in the world”). 
 6. Laurie Goodstein, Poll Finds U.S. Muslims Thriving, but Not Content, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
2, 2009, at A11. 
 7. 2007 STUDY, supra note 3, at 18. 
 8. Id.; see also Mann, supra note 3, at 1142.  There is a stark difference between the 
economic integration of Muslims in the United States and their integration in Western European 
Countries.  2007 STUDY, supra note 3, at 19.  In a 2006 survey, Muslim populations in Spain, 
Germany, Great Britain, and France reported disproportionately high percentages of their Muslim 
population in the lowest income category (73%, 53%, 61%, and 61%, respectively).  Id. 
 9. Id. at 1.  Of foreign-born adult Muslims in America, 24% are from the Arab region, 8% 
are from Pakistan, 10% are from other parts of South Asia, 8% are from Iran, 5% are from 
Europe, 4% are from other parts of Africa, and 6% are from other regions of the world.  Id.  
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American citizens.10  About 39% of Muslims have immigrated to the United 
States since 1990.11  The reasons given by American Muslims for immigration 
vary greatly.  Close to equal numbers cite educational opportunities (26%), 
economic opportunities (24%), and family reasons (24%).12  Twenty percent 
say that they came to the United States because of persecution or conflict in 
their home country.13 
With respect to racial composition, no single racial group constitutes a 
majority of the Muslim population in America, with 38% describing 
themselves as white, 26% describing themselves as black, 20% as Asian, and 
16% choosing to answer other/mixed.14  Yet, in a different poll conducted by 
Gallup in March of 2009, only 28% of American Muslims identified as white, 
35% as Black, 18% as Asian, and 18% as other.15 
Most American Muslims say that religion is very important to them, and 
they accept the basic tenets of their faith.16  There is religious diversity within 
the American Muslim population.  A Pew study found that 50% say they are 
Sunni, 22% are Muslim without any affiliation, 16% are Shia, 5% identify as 
other, and 7% did not give a response.17  Additionally, 23% of Muslims report 
 
Native-born adult Muslims comprise 35% of Muslims in the United States; 20% are African–
American, and 15% are “Other.”  Id.  See also Nina J. Crimm, Muslim-Americans’ Charitable 
Giving Dilemma: What About a Centralized Terror-Free Donor Advised Fund, 13 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 375, 382 (2008).  Another 7% of Muslim Americans have parents who 
were immigrants.  Id. at 381.  The Muslim immigrants come from at least sixty-eight different 
countries.  Id. at 382. 
 10. Id. at 15. 
 11. See id. at 1.  Years immigrated by the 65% of Muslims who are foreign-born: 18% 
immigrated between 2000–2007, 21% immigrated between 1990–1999, 15% immigrated between 
1980–1989, and 11% immigrated before 1980.  Id. 
 12. Id. at 16. 
 13. Id.  Of those citing conflict or persecution as a reason for immigrating are those 
emigrating from: Iran (26%), Arab nations (19%), and South Asian countries (19%).  Id. 
 14. 2007 STUDY, supra note 3, at 17.  The survey further broke down each racial group into 
whether the Muslim was foreign born or native born with 56% of native-born Muslims describing 
themselves as black.  Id. 
 15. THE MUSLIM WEST FACTS PROJECT, MUSLIM AMERICANS: A NATIONAL PORTRAIT 21 
(2009) [hereinafter 2009 GALLUP POLL], available at http://www.muslimwestfacts.com/mwf/ 
File/116074/AmericanMuslimReport.pdf.  The Gallup poll also compared these statistics on race 
with Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and Mormons in the United States, where 76%–93% were 
reportedly white.  Id. 
 16. 2007 STUDY, supra note 3, at 24.  Seventy-two percent of Muslim Americans responded 
that religion was “very important” and 40% of Muslim Americans attend a mosque more than 
once a week.  Id.  A March 2009 Gallup Poll revealed that 80% of Muslim Americans answered 
in the affirmative when asked whether religion was an important part of their daily life.  2009 
GALLUP POLL, supra note 15, at 28.  Additionally, the report found that 41% of young Muslim 
Americans (18–29) attend their place of worship at least once a week.  Id. at 97. 
 17. 2007 STUDY, supra note 3, at 21. 
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that they are converts to Islam.18  Ninety-one percent of converts were born in 
the United States and 59% of all converts are African–American.19  There are 
around 2000 Islamic schools, mosques, and centers in America.20  
Although Muslims have lived in the United States for over one hundred 
years, “they have lived largely at the margins of political history.”21  Their 
involvement in political and legal matters has been limited.22  For many years, 
American Muslims “enjoyed a degree of anonymity that allowed them to 
concentrate on economic advancement and pursuit of the American dream.”23  
It was not really until the 1990s that American Muslims began to mobilize at 
the local and national levels to assert themselves politically and legally—
particularly to pursue violations of their civil rights.24  As a result of this 
mobilization, organizations like the Council on American–Islamic Relations 
(CAIR) and the Islamic Society of North America, among others, were 
formed.25 
With regard to political views, the Pew study found that American 
Muslims are largely liberal with regard to the size and scope of government,26 
but socially conservative.27  A majority of American Muslims either lean 
towards or identify with the Democratic Party (63%).28  Of the general public, 
51% lean toward or identify with the Democratic Party.29 
At the same time, many American Muslims—particularly second-
generation American Muslims, are becoming actively involved in the political 
 
 18. Id. at 22. 
 19. Id.  Fifty-five percent of converts subscribe to Sunni tradition, and 49% of converts 
converted before age twenty-one.  Id. 
 20. Council on American-Islamic Relations, supra note 1. 
 21. See Kathleen M. Moore, Muslims in the United States: Pluralism Under Exceptional 
Circumstances, 612 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 116, 122 (2007). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 123. 
 24. Id. at 125. 
 25. Id. at 125–26. 
 26. 2007 STUDY, supra note 3, at 41.  Seventy percent of U.S. Muslims reportedly prefer 
bigger government, versus the general public where 43% prefer bigger government.  Id. at 41, 44.  
Additionally, 73% of Muslims say that the government should do more to aid the poor.  Id. at 41. 
 27. See id.  With regards to protecting morality, 59% say that the government should do 
more compared with the general public where only 37% believe the government should do more 
to protect morality.  Id. at 41, 46.  Also, 61% said that homosexually should be discouraged 
instead of accepted or neither.  Id. at 45.  Of the general public, 51% of Americans said that 
homosexuality should be accepted.  Id. 
 28. Id. at 41.  Seventy-one percent of Muslim Americans say they supported John Kerry in 
the 2004 presidential election.  Id.  The higher percentage of Muslims who voted Democratic may 
correlate to the Pew finding that 75% of Muslim Americans believe that going to war in Iraq was 
wrong.  Id. at 49. 
 29. Id. at 42. 
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process.30  In the past several years, the first two American Muslims were 
elected to Congress.31  Muslims strongly supported the candidacy of Barack 
Obama, although that support was not without controversy.32  In any event, 
like many immigrant communities that preceded them, American Muslims are 
starting to contribute to American society on a more active level.33  “While 
their parents’ generation might prefer isolation from the mainstream, the 
political involvement of young Muslim Americans is increasing, demonstrated 
by the rising number of registered voters, civil servants, and candidates for 
public office.”34 
II.  POST-9/11 CRIMES AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MUSLIMS35 
This working knowledge of the identity of American Muslims illuminates 
life for Muslims after the attacks of 9/11.  A 2007 Pew Research Study found 
that 53% of American Muslims say it has become more difficult to be a 
Muslim in the United States since September 11, 2001.36  This belief is widely 
held by wealthier and better-educated Muslims.37  Twenty-five percent of 
Muslims in the United States say they have been victims of discrimination.38  
FBI Hate Crime Statistics from 2000 and 2001 indicated over a 1600% 
increase in hate crimes reported as “anti-Islamic.”39  The number of actual 
crimes against Muslims rose from twenty-eight in 2000 to 481 in 2001.40  
 
 30.  Carla Power, The New Islam, NEWSWEEK, MAR. 16, 1998, at 37. 
 31. The first two Muslim Congressmen are Keith Ellison of Minnesota and Andre Carson of 
Indiana. See Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Muslims Seeking Greater Influence—Effort Puts Resumes 
of Top Candidates in White House Hands, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 2009, at 10. 
 32. See id. (documenting reports of Obama’s staff preventing Muslim women wearing hijab 
from being photographed behind him). 
 33. Kathleen M. Moore, supra note 21, at 122–23. 
 34.  Id. 
 35. See generally AMNESTY INT’L, THREAT AND HUMILIATION: RACIAL PROFILING, 
DOMESTIC SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1–12 (2004), available at 
www.amnestyusa.org/racial_profiling/report/rp_report.pdf (assessing the Civil Rights concerns of 
Muslim Americans and containing narratives of victims of racial profiling). 
 36. 2007 STUDY, supra note 3, at 4. Additionally, most American Muslims “believe that the 
government ‘singles out’ Muslims for increased surveillance and monitoring.”  Id. at 2. 
 37. Id. at 35.  Sixty-five percent of those who have attended graduate school and 68% of 
those with incomes of $100,000 or more say it has become more difficult to be Muslim in post 
9/11 America.  Id. 
 38. Id. at 4. Forty-one percent of native-born Muslims claim they have been victims of 
discrimination versus 18% of foreign born.  Id. 
 39. See Jonathan K. Stubbs, The Bottom Rung of America’s Race Ladder: After the 
September 11 Catastrophe Are American Muslims Becoming America’s New N . . . . s?, 19 J.L. & 
RELIGION 115, 121 (2004) (citing Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting 
(foreword) (2002), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/01hate.pdf). 
 40. James Curry Woods, The Third Tower: The Effect of the September 11th Terrorist 
Attacks on the American Jury System, 55 ALA. L. REV. 209, 211 (2003) (quoting Curt Anderson, 
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These crimes included assaults (both physical and verbal), threats, vandalism, 
and even murder.41  Specifically, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, men were 
charged in Seattle and Texas in attempting to burn down local mosques.42  In 
Arizona, an Indian Sikh gas station owner (apparently mistaken for a Muslim) 
was murdered in response to the attacks.43 
Discrimination against Muslims also took other forms.  CAIR, a national 
civil rights advocacy group, reports yearly on the status of Muslim civil rights 
in the United States.44  In its 2001 report (for the year 2000), CAIR  reported a 
15% increase in the number of civil-rights complaints from the previous year.45  
The main complaints were by Muslims for the lack of accommodation in their 
workplace and schools for daily prayers, Friday prayers, and other Islamic 
rituals.46  The most numerous complaints were hijab related.47 
In its 2002 report (for the year 2001), CAIR reported that the United States 
government’s action post-9/11 affected more than 60,000 American 
Muslims.48  CAIR received 1516 complaints, which represented a three-fold 
increase in the number of complaints—most of which were bias-motivated 
harassment or violence.49  Excluding September 11 backlash incidents, the 
normal reporting period contained 525 validated complaints—an increase of 
43%.50  Such incidents included firings or refusal to hire; failure to 
accommodate religious practices in schools, workplaces, and prisons; profiling 
in airports; the detention or interrogation of Muslims by federal or local 
authority; and denial of services or access to public accommodations.51 
 
FBI Reports Jump in Violence Against Muslins, VICTORIA ADVOC.,  Nov. 25, 2002, available at 
http://www.thevictoriaadvocate.com/24hour/nation/story/645165p-4867767c.html). 
 41. Riad Z. Abdelkarim, M.D., American Muslims and 9/11: A Community Looks Back and 
to the Future, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Sept–Oct. 2002, at 82. 
 42. Woods, supra note 40, at 210. 
 43. Id. 
 44. CAIR is the largest American-Muslim civil rights organization in the United States, 
serving more than seven million American Muslims through its thirty-five chapters and offices 
nationwide and in Canada.  COUNCIL FOR AMERICAN ISLAMIC RELATIONS, THE STATUS OF 
MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 3 (2008), available at http://www.cair.com/ 
Portals/0/pdf/civilrights2008.pdf. 
 45. CAIR, THE STATUS OF MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2001), available 
at http://www.cair.com/CivilRights/CivilRightsReports/2001Report.aspx. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. CAIR, THE STATUS OF MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002), available 
at http://www.cair.com/CivilRights/CivilRightsReports/2002Report.aspx. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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More recently, in its 2008 Report (for the 2007 calendar year), CAIR 
processed a total of 2652 civil rights complaints.52  While there were decreased 
incidents of anti-Muslim hate crime complaints as well as alleged incidents at 
schools or incidents involving the police, they are still prevalent.53 
For instance, in June of 2007, a twenty-six-year-old Muslim man was 
attacked while leaving a St. Cloud, Minnesota mosque.54  He was called a 
“Muslim terrorist” and shoved and elbowed in the head by the assailant.55  The 
police were notified, and they called the attack a bias-motivated crime.56 
On August 8, 2007, an “acid bomb” was thrown out of a car window near 
Muslims (an imam and another mosque official) standing outside an Arizona 
mosque, the Albanian American Islamic Center of Arizona.57  The bomb 
landed within twenty to twenty-five feet of them.58  They reported “a chemical 
smell after the container exploded,” but no one was hurt.59 
In September of 2007, an Iranian American salon owner was opening her 
shop in New York when two assailants surprised and viciously beat her.60  The 
men called her “terrorist” and wrote anti-Muslim slurs on a mirror in her 
salon.61 
In addition to these hate crimes, “[d]iscrimination in the workplace 
increased by 18%, with 384 cases reported in 2006 and 452 cases reported in 
2007.”62  In one report made to CAIR in April of 2007, a sixty-six-year-old 
Muslim worker reported that fellow co-workers at a BMW Manufacturing Co. 
plant in Spartanburg, South Carolina repeatedly made comments to him such 
as, “Muslims are no good. They should all be killed,” and, “We will f**k up 
your family, we’ll kill you all.”63  This situation escalated when one of the co-
workers confronted the Muslim in a restroom at work, put a boxcutter to his 
 
 52. CAIR, THE STATUS OF MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2008), 
available at http://www.cair.com/Portals/0/pdf/civilrights2008.pdf. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Associated Press, Man Is Charged with Assault Allegedly Attacked Man After Prayer, 
INFOCUS NEWS, June 26, 2007, available at http://www.infocusnews.net/content/view/15499/ 
327/; see also CAIR, supra note 45, at 20. 
 55. Associated Press, supra note 48. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Arizona Mosque Targeted in “Acid Bomb” Attack, REUTERS, Aug. 8, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN0833871920070808?feedType=RSS&rpc=2
2&sp=true; CAIR, supra note 45, at 21. 
 58. CAIR, supra note 45, at 21. 
 59. Id. 
 60. James Fanelli, Muslim Biz Gal Beaten, N.Y. Post, Sep. 16, 2007; CAIR, supra note 45, 
at 21. 
 61. CAIR, supra note 45, at 21. 
 62. Id. at 5. 
 63. Muslim BMW Worker Says He Was Threatened, Columbia State, April 5, 2007; see also 
CAIR, supra note 45, at 23. 
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throat, and said: “I’ll slice your throat and kill you.”64  The Muslim worker 
filed a report with the Spartanburg County Sheriff’s Office.65 
Also in 2007, two Muslim workers were fired and three others left their 
employment with the Gold’n Plump Poultry plant in Arcadia, Wisconsin.66  
The workers’ dispute arose out of the company’s “floating break” policy.67  
During this break, the workers would perform the fajr prayer (the break-of-
dawn prayer), one of five daily Islamic prayers.68  The company previously 
accommodated the prayers with a floating break for several months, but 
subsequently issued a new policy that prevented the workers from performing 
their religious obligations.69 
While there were decreases in cases involving due process issues, physical 
violence, denials of service or access, and verbal harassment, they are still a 
part of the reality in which Muslims live in America.  Women have reported 
discrimination based on wearing the hijab (traditional Islamic head covering).  
In July of 2007, a Muslim woman was denied entry into a municipal courtroom 
in Georgia because she was wearing a hijab.70  This is despite the fact that she 
consented to walk through the metal detector and to allow the officers to scan 
her scarf with a handheld metal detector.71  Subsequently, in December of 
2008, a Muslim woman was jailed after a dispute at another Georgia 
courthouse over whether she could enter the courtroom with her hijab.72 
CAIR reports that in 2007, passenger-profiling complaints jumped from 
thirty-two in 2006 to 141 in 2007, a 340% increase.73  Most notably, in 
November of 2006, six imams (clerics in Islam) were removed from a US 
Airways flight reportedly because they were praying together before boarding 
the plane, which caused some staff and passengers to become suspicious.74  
The six imams were removed from the flight and questioned for several hours 
by law enforcement officials before being released.75  No charges were filed 
 
 64. CAIR, supra note 45, at 23. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Oskar Garcia, 70 Somalis Who Quit Jobs over Prayer Time Return to Work, 
JOURNALSTAR.COM , May 26, 2007, http://www.journalstar.com/business/article_c5a4ef36-5a73-
5abb-97ec-5c7a2a2ea873.html.  See also CAIR, supra note 45, at 23. 
 67. CAIR, supra note 45, at 23. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Ponder, supra note 1, at 38; see also Associated Press, Muslim Woman Barred from 
Georgia Courtroom for Wearing Scarf, July 1, 2007. 
 71.  Ponder, supra note 1, at 38. 
 72. Associated Press, U.S. Judge Jails Muslim Woman over Headscarf, MSNBC, Dec. 17, 
2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28278572/?gt1=43001. 
 73. CAIR, supra note 45, at 5. 
 74. Heena Musabji & Christina Abraham, The Threat to Civil Liberties and Its Effects on 
Muslims in America, 1 DEPAUL J.  SOC. JUST. 83, 96 (2007). 
 75. Id. 
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against these men.76  These men subsequently filed suit, which will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section of this paper.77 
More recently, in January of 2009, nine Muslim passengers were removed 
from an AirTran Airways flight at Ronald Reagan Washington National 
Airport.78  The Muslim passengers were reportedly removed from the flight 
because another passenger overheard one of the Muslims ask his wife where 
the safest place to sit on the plane would be.79  These Muslims were not 
allowed to reboard the plane and were detained for interrogation by local law 
enforcement officers, the FBI and TSA.80  They were later cleared after 
questioning and offered refunds.81  The airline later issued a public apology to 
the Muslim passengers as well as to the other passengers on the flight for their 
inconvenience, acknowledging the misunderstanding and made an offer to 
compensate the passengers.82 
Overall, nine states and the District of Columbia made up more than 80% 
of all the discriminatory complaints made to CAIR in 2007.83  As is true with 
prior years, a person’s ethnic background, religion, or “Muslim name” were 
the paramount factors that triggered discrimination.84  These criteria are likely 
to have been responsible for 63% of all cases reported to CAIR in 2007.85 
III.  RECENT CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION BY MUSLIMS 
Much, though certainly not all, of the discrimination against American 
Muslims has been reported to law enforcement and civil rights groups.  In 
some of these cases, American Muslims sought to challenge the discrimination 
in court.  This section discusses these cases.  This is not intended to be a 
laundry list of all American Muslim-inspired litigation, but rather seeks to 
analyze a few recently prominent decisions dealing with the civil rights of 
American Muslims in post-9/11 America. 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Part III.B infra. 
 78. Liz Robbins, Muslim Family Excluded from AirTran Flight, http://thelede.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2009/01/02/muslim-family-excluded-from-airtran-flight/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2009); 
see also Part III.C infra. 
 79. Robbins, supra note 79. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. CAIR, supra note 45, at 5. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
926 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:917 
A. Work Place Discrimination Suits 
After the 9/11 attacks, discrimination against American Muslims in the 
workplace based on religion and/or national origin rose tremendously.86  Some 
of these Muslims started going to the courthouses to address this 
discrimination—with some, although limited, success.  Recently, in January 
2009, Abraham Yasin filed a two-count complaint against Cook County 
Sheriff’s Department of Corrections, the Sheriff of Cook County and the Cook 
County Sheriff’s Office, alleging a Title VII hostile work environment claim 
based on national origin and a hostile work environment claim based on 
ancestry under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.87  One defendant filed a motion for summary 
judgment arguing, “Yasin has failed to establish that the alleged conduct was 
severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of his employment and 
create a hostile and abusive work environment.”88  The district court disagreed 
and found that “[v]iewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in Yasin’s 
favor . . . he has presented evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact for 
trial that his co-workers’ conduct was severe or pervasive enough to alter the 
conditions of his employment and create a hostile and abusive work 
environment.”89  Specifically, the court found that Yasin’s co-workers made 
remarks about his ancestry and national origin at least one hundred times in 
over one-year—including remarks such as “terrorist,” “sand nigger,” “bin 
Laden,” “shoe bomber,” and “camel jockey.”90  The court concluded, “In sum, 
[we] would be hard-pressed to conclude, as a matter of law, that the 
correctional officers’ conduct did not create a hostile work environment based 
on Yasin’s national origin and ancestry.”91 
The defendant also argued that they were entitled to summary judgment 
because Yasin failed to present evidence that there was a basis for his 
employer’s liability.92  The parties agreed that the defendant was aware of 
Yasin’s allegations regarding the inappropriate conduct by his co-workers.93  
The question before the court was “whether the Sheriff’s Office was negligent 
in discovering or remedying the alleged harassment.”94  The court found that 
“taking well over a year to address Yasin’s harassment complaints is not a 
 
 86. Ponder, supra note 1, at 32–33. 
 87. Yasin v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept., 2009 WL 1210620, at *1 (N.D. Ill.May 4, 2009). 
Plaintiff’s original complaint was filed in March of 2007 and the complaint filed in January of 
2009 was a second amended complaint. See Complaint, Yasin v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept., 
No. C-01266 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2007). 
 88. Yasin, 2009 WL 1210620 at *4. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at *5. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Yasin, 2009 WL 1210620 at *5. 
 94. Id. 
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‘prompt’ or ‘expeditious’ reaction to the complaints, especially in light of the 
numerous times Yasin complained to his supervisors and IAD.95  The court 
concluded, “Based on these circumstances, Yasin has raised an issue of fact for 
trial whether the Sheriff’s Office took an ‘appropriate corrective action [that is] 
reasonably likely to prevent harassment from recurring.’”96  Defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment was thereby denied and the case proceeded to 
trial.97  In July of 2009, the jury returned a verdict for Yasin in the amount of 
“$200,000 in damages for harassment it found to be so pervasive or severe to 
create a hostile and abusive work environment.”98 
Other Muslim plaintiffs have not been as successful.  In April 2009, the 
Third Circuit affirmed a district court decision that police officer Kimberlie 
Webb’s request to wear a headscarf with her uniform could not be reasonably 
accommodated without imposing an undue burden upon the City of 
Philadelphia.99 
In February 2003, Webb, a practicing Muslim, was denied permission to 
wear a headscarf100 while in uniform and on duty.101  Although the headscarf 
would cover neither Webb’s face nor ears, Philadelphia Police Department 
Directive 78102 did not authorize “the wearing of religious symbols or garb as 
part of the uniform.”103  On August 12–14, 2003, Webb wore her headscarf to 
work, but was sent home each day when she refused to remove it.104  After 
being informed on August 14, 2003 that her conduct could lead to disciplinary 
action, Webb discontinued wearing the headscarf to work.105  Nevertheless, 
Webb received a thirteen-day suspension for insubordination.106 
Following her suspension, Webb brought suit alleging violations under 
Title VII for religious discrimination, retaliation/hostile work environment, and 
 
 95. Id. at *6. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Press Release, CAIR, CAIR-Chicago Wins Bias Suit for Arab-American Officer (July 
24, 2009), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS202828+24-Jul-2009 
+PRN20090724); see also Judgment in a civil case, Yasin v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept., No. C-
01266 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2009). 
 99. Webb v. Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 258 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 100. “The headscarf (a khimar or hijaab) is a traditional headcovering worn by Muslim 
women.”  Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Directive 78 is “the authoritative memorandum which prescribes the approved 
Philadelphia police uniforms and equipment.”  Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Webb, 562 F.3d at 258. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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sex discrimination.107  The district court granted summary judgment against 
Webb on all counts reasoning “the City would suffer an undue hardship if 
forced to permit Webb and other officers to wear religious clothing or 
ornamentation with their uniforms.”108  Webb appealed the adverse judgments 
on the religious and sex discrimination to the Third Circuit.109 
The Third Circuit agreed with the district court’s holding that Webb 
established a prima facie case for religious discrimination in that: (1) “Webb’s 
religious beliefs are sincere;” (2) “her employer understood the conflict 
between her beliefs and her employment requirements;” and (3) “she was 
disciplined for failing to comply with a conflicting official requirement.”110  
Thus, the burden shifted to the City to demonstrate that to reasonably 
accommodate Webb would impose an undue hardship.111  The City contended 
an undue hardship existed because “[i]f not for the strict enforcement of 
Directive 78 . . . the essential values of impartiality, religious neutrality, 
uniformity, and the subordination of personal preference would be severely 
damaged to the detriment of the proper functioning of the police 
department.”112  Webb contended genuine issues of material fact existed 
because “other police officers displayed religious symbols, such as cross pins 
on their uniforms, with no disciplinary repercussions.”113  The Third Circuit, 
having noted the “presumption of legislative validity” given to a police 
department’s choice of organization and dress,114 agreed with the City.115  In 
affirming the district court’s adverse judgment, the Third Circuit concluded 
that “uniform requirements are crucial to the safety of officers . . . morale and 
spirit de corps, and public confidence in the police.”116 
Despite the mixed results of Yasin and Webb, American Muslims plaintiffs 
continue to battle workplace discrimination and attempt to assert their rights in 
court.  For instance, Waheed Rehan, a Muslim man from Pakistan, filed a suit 
in July of 2009 in federal district court alleging that he suffered similar 
harassment at his place of employment, resulting in his unjustified 
 
 107. Id.  Webb also brought one cause of action under the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom 
Protection Act. 
 108. Id. at 258–59. The District Court also stated, “[Directive 78’s] detailed standards with no 
accommodation for religious symbols and attire not only promote the need for uniformity, but 
also enhance cohesiveness, cooperation, and the esprit de corps of the police force.” Webb v. 
Philadelphia, 2007 WL 1866763, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
 109. Webb, 562 F.3d at 259. 
 110. Id. at 261. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 262. The court held Webb presented no specific evidence of her assertions that 
would create a genuine issue of material fact.  Id. 
 114. Webb, 562 F.3d at 260. (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1975)). 
 115. Id. at 262. 
 116. Id. 
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termination.117  Rehan claims that he faced discrimination by his co-workers at 
his former employer, Affiliated Computer Services.118  Rehan was subjected to 
such remarks as “terrorist” and “bin Laden.”119  In addition to verbal attacks, 
Rehan was subjected to physical abuse such as having aerosol cleaner sprayed 
on his head and eyes.120  Rehan reported the conduct, but his bonuses were 
subsequently cut significantly, and his workload increased, before finally being 
terminated without justification.121  Rehan brought several causes of action 
alleging discrimination based on religion, national origin, and race, as well as 
for retaliation.122  The case is currently stayed pending arbitration.123 
B. Racial Profiling and Discrimination Against Muslims while Traveling 
Another area where American Muslims face discrimination is in traveling.  
Since 2001, the Department of Transportation has received over 1000 
complaints of discrimination against United States airlines.124  Similarly, the 
Transportation Security Administration has received over 1000 complaints 
against its personnel.125  American Arab and Muslim organizations continue to 
document this type of discrimination.  American Muslims are reporting this 
conduct to the proper authorities and agencies—but they are also filing 
lawsuits. 
In 2002, Assem Bayaa brought a claim for illegal discrimination against 
United Airlines following his removal from a flight.126  Bayaa is “an American 
Citizen of Lebanese and Palestinian descent who works full time in Saudi 
Arabia, but travels to California frequently to visit family and to conduct 
business.”127  United Airlines provided the most convenient route between the 
two countries, and was thus regularly used by Bayaa.128  On December 23, 
2001, Bayaa arrived at LAX to board a United Airlines flight back to Saudi 
Arabia.129  When Bayaa checked his two suitcases that morning, one was 
 
 117. Complaint, Rehan v. Affiliated Computer Servs., Inc., No. 09-04106 (N.D.Ill. July 8, 
2009). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 3. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 4. 
 122. Complaint at 6, Rehan, No. 09-04106. 
 123. Order on Motion to Stay, Rehan v. Affiliated Computer Services, Inc., No. 09-04106 
(N.D.Ill. July 27, 2009). 
 124. Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Margaret B. Kwoka, Title VI Disparate Impact Claims Would 
Not Harm National Security—A Response to Paul Taylor, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 503, 513–14 
(2009). 
 125. Id. at 514. 
 126. Bayaa v. United Airlines, Inc., 249 F.Supp. 2d 1198, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 127. Id. at 1199. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1200. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
930 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:917 
immediately “searched on the spot.”130  After passing through security without 
incident, Bayaa arrived at his gate where he was searched with a hand-wand 
and his carry-on bag was inspected.131  Once aboard the plane, but before 
taking his seat, Bayaa was asked to exit the plane because “the crew [did] not 
feel comfortable having [him] on board.”132  After being removed from the 
flight, United Airlines attempted to book Bayaa another flight; however, 
“[e]mbarrassed and humiliated, Bayaa refused the flight, and traveled, instead, 
on another airline.”133  Bayaa subsequently filed discrimination claims under § 
1981 and Title VI seeking injunctive and declaratory relief that “the court 
declare illegal [United Airlines’] alleged pattern and practice of removing 
individuals from flights based on perceived Middle Eastern ethnicity, and to 
enjoin [United Airlines] from engaging in this conduct in the future.”134 
United Airlines filed a motion to dismiss, arguing Bayaa’s claims were 
preempted by the Warsaw Convention.135  But the court rejected this 
contention holding the Warsaw Convention preempted claims for damages, not 
claims for equitable relief such as Bayaa’s.136  Having decided Bayaa’s claims 
were not preempted, the court’s analysis turned to whether it could redress 
Bayaa’s alleged injury.137  The court reasoned that because Bayaa is an 
American citizen who travels frequently on United Airlines from his place of 
work in Saudi Arabia to visit his family, and conduct business in America, he 
demonstrated “that he is realistically threatened by a repetition of [the 
violation].”138  As such, Bayaa would be entitled to injunctive relief.  In 
rejecting United Airlines’ final argument, that the injunction would conflict 
with its duty to use discretion under 49 U.S.C. § 44902,139 the court stated that 
“[d]efendant’s duty under 49 U.S.C. § 44902 does not grant them a license to 
discriminate.”140  Accordingly, the court denied United’s motion to dismiss.141 
The parties ultimately agreed to settle the case.142  In addition to a $94,000 
payment, United Airlines agreed to provide various non-monetary relief, such 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Bayaa, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 1200. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1200, 1205. 
 135. See id. at 1201. 
 136. Bayaa, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 1201–02. 
 137. Id. at 1205. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. This statute addresses the regulations under which an air carrier may refuse to 
transport passengers and property.  See 49 U.S.C. § 44902 (2006). 
 140. Bayaa, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 1205. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Motion of Entry into Comprehensive Settlement Agreement at 1, Bayaa v. United 
Airlines, No. 02-B-48191 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. Mar. 21, 2005). 
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as annual civil rights training to its public contact employees, and to ensure 
appropriate follow-up to any discrimination complaints.143 
More recently, six imams who were removed from a U.S. Airways flight 
brought causes of action for violations of their Fourth Amendment rights to 
freedom from unreasonable seizures and their Fourteenth Amendment rights to 
equal protection of the law.144  On November 20, 2006, the imams were 
traveling back home after attending a conference in Minneapolis, Minnesota.145  
While waiting at the gate for their U.S. Airways flight, three of the six men 
decided to pray their final two prayers of the day—the other three remained in 
their seats.146  The men prayed “for roughly five minutes” and boarded the 
plane soon after.147  The men were not seated together, and took their seats 
throughout the cabin.148  At some point, a passenger passed a note to the 
captain relating that he had seen “six Middle Eastern men praying loudly in 
Arabic in the gate area and saying ‘Allah, Allah.’”149  Airport police were 
called in and the passenger who passed the note related his observations to the 
police and noted the “‘mysterious’ or ‘weird’ seating arrangement” of the 
imams.150  The police decided the loud prayers and seating configuration 
“amounted to suspicious behavior” and the imams were removed from the 
plane and taken into custody.151  The imams were placed in police cars and 
taken to the police command center where they were separated, isolated, and 
interrogated for five to six hours before being released without being 
charged.152  When they then tried to rebook a flight, U.S. Airways denied them 
service.153 
In support of their unlawful seizure claim, the plaintiffs alleged there was a 
lack of reasonable articulable suspicion when the FBI officer requested their 
detention for questioning, or alternatively, there was a lack of probable cause 
to arrest the plaintiffs.154  Upon reviewing the information available to the FBI 
and Metropolitan Airport Commission (“MAC”) officials at the time of the 
arrest,155 the court reasoned “[the FBI agent] has not identified any crime, nor 
 
 143. Id. at 7. 
 144. Shqeirat v. U.S. Airways, 645 F. Supp. 2d 765, 771, 774, 777, 789  (D.Minn. 2009). 
 145. Id. at 771. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 772. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Shqeirat, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 772–73. 
 150. Id. at 773. 
 151. Id. at 774. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Shqeirat, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 777. 
 155. This information was: “(1) three of the Plaintiffs observed the Muslim Maghreb prayer at 
the gate before boarding Flight 300; (2) Shahin and Sadeddin requested seatbelt extensions; (3) 
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does the court know of any crime, for which these allegations create arguable 
probable cause.”156  As such, the court held the arrest of the plaintiffs 
constituted “a violation of Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable seizures.”157  Moreover, the court denied the FBI agent’s claim 
for qualified immunity stating that “no reasonable officer could have believed 
that the arrest of Plaintiffs was proper.”158 
The court reached the same conclusions when analyzing the unlawful 
seizure claim against the MAC.  In finding no basis for probable cause, the 
court stated: 
After only a cursory, routine investigation, several of these concerns would 
have been eliminated leaving no basis for probable cause based on the 
remaining information.  Praying in public, commenting on current events, and 
even criticizing governmental policy is protected speech under the First 
Amendment. Plaintiffs’ Middle Eastern descent does not change the analysis. 
Similar behavior by Russian Orthodox priests or Franciscan monks would 
likely not have elicited this response.159 
The court found the MAC’s attempt to use the events of September 11 as a 
defense for its actions unpersuasive: 
Defendants suggest that the attacks of September 11, 2001—perpetrated by 
men of Middle Eastern descent who espoused a radical version of Islam—
justifies a massive curtailment of liberty whenever terrorism, and in this case, 
the suspicion of Islamic terrorism, is concerned.  Unquestionably the events of 
9/11 changed the calculus in the balance American society chooses to make, 
especially in airport settings, between liberty and security.  Ultimately, the 
proper balance will be achieved, in large part, because we have the most 
capable and diligent law enforcement and intelligence communities in the 
world. But when a law enforcement officer exercises the power of the 
Sovereign over its citizens, she or he has a responsibility to operate within the 
bounds of the Constitution and cannot raise the specter of 9/11 as an absolute 
exception to that responsibility.160 
 
Shahin left his seat to talk to Sadeddin; and (4) Plaintiffs were Muslim clerics, possibly of Middle 
Eastern origin.” Id. at 779. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 780. 
 159. Shqeirat, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 786. 
 160. Id. at 788; See Chowdhury v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1154 (N.D.Cal. 
2002) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss by reasoning “[t]he fact that the pilot is in control 
of the aircraft does not . . . ‘grant [the airlines] a license to discriminate.’”); but see Dasrath v. 
Cont’l Airlines, Inc.  467 F. Supp. 2d 431, 433 (D.N.J.,2006) (Muslim plaintiff’s case dismissed 
on summary judgment); Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2008) (reversing a 
jury verdict in favor of plaintiff). 
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The court also denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the 
equal protection claim.161  Plaintiffs alleged the MAC “intentionally 
discriminated against them based on their race, religion, color, or national 
origin in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . .”162  The court found that among the factors considered in 
detaining the plaintiffs were: their “Middle Eastern ethnicity,” their “Arabic 
dialect,” and the chanting of the words “Allah, Allah, Allah.”163  The court 
reasoned these facts “could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that they were 
arrested at least partly on the basis of their race, religion, or national origin.”164  
Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied.165  The 
decision was appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.166  
Subsequently, the parties reached a confidential settlement.167 
These suits alleging post-9/11 racial profiling and discrimination by 
airlines have been met with some success.  More importantly, these lawsuits 
have raised awareness of this significant problem, and potentially will begin to 
open dialogue, and promote education by airlines, regarding these 
discriminatory practices. 
C. Religious Charities 
Finally, one area of major concern to American Muslims is the treatment 
of Islamic charities in post-9/11 America.  On September 23, 2001, just days 
removed from the attacks of 9/11, President Bush issued Executive Order 
13,224 in response to the “grave acts of terrorism . . . and the continuing and 
immediate threat of further on United States nationals or the United States.”168  
Executive Order 13,224 gave the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (“OFAC”) “broad authority to designate individuals and 
organizations as ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorists’ (“SDGTs”).”169  
Such a designation allows OFAC to freeze all assets of a SDGT pending 
investigation pursuant to a blocking order, and criminalize all transactions with 
 
 161. Id. at 789. 
 162. Id. at 788–89. 
 163. Id. at 789. 
 164. Shqeirat, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 789. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Shqierat v. U.S. Airways Group, 645 F. Supp. 2d (D.Minn. 2009), appeal docketed, No. 
09-2979 (8th Cir. Sept. 18, 2009). 
 167. Shqierat v. U.S. Airways Group, No. 07-1513 (D.Minn. filed Oct. 10, 2009) 
(confidential settlement agreement reached). 
 168. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). 
 169. David Klass, Asset Freezing of Islamic Charities Under the International Economic 
Emergency Powers Act: A Fourth Amendment Analysis, 14 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. 
JUST. 155, 156 (2007). 
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the designated entity.170  In the years since 9/11, Executive Order 13,224 has 
been used to block the assets of American Muslim charity organizations.  In 
response, these organizations have turned to the courts to challenge the 
constitutionality of these blocking orders.171 
Initial efforts by Muslim charities to attack the blocking orders met with 
little success.  On December 4, 2001, OFAC designated Holy Land Foundation 
as a SDGT due to allegedly acting for or on behalf of Hamas.172  At the time, 
Holy Land was the largest American Muslim charitable foundation with a 
budget of close to $12 million.173  In conjunction with the SDGT designation, 
OFAC issued a blocking order “freezing all of [Holy Land’s] funds, accounts 
and real property.”174 
Holy Land subsequently challenged the SDGT designation and blocking 
order in court, alleging various statutory and constitutional violations.175  But 
the court rejected Holy Land’s claims,176 including its Due Process177 and 
Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure challenges.178  In rejecting the Due 
Process claim, the court reasoned the OFAC action “flows from a 
Presidentially declared national emergency”179 thus qualifying as an 
“‘extraordinary’ situation in which postponement of notice and hearing until 
 
 170. See id. at 160. “Neither the IEEPA nor the Executive Orders specify what evidence is 
needed to issue a blocking order—apparently it is within OFAC’s discretion.” Id. at 161. 
 171. For further discussion of the statutory framework behind the blocking orders and the 
implementation against American Muslim charities, see generally Laila Al-Marayati, American 
Muslim Charities: Easy Targets in the War on Terror, 25 PACE L. REV. 321 (2005); Klass, supra 
note 169; Danielle Stampley, Blocking Access to Assets: Compromising Civil Rights to Protect 
National Security or Unconstitutional Infringement on Due Process and the Right to Hire an 
Attorney?, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 683 (2008). 
 172. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 62, 64 (D.D.C. 
2002). Hamas is a large and influential militant Palestinian political group. See Backgrounder: 
Hamas, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (Aug. 27, 2009) available at http://www.cfr.org/ 
publication/8968#p1. 
 173. See Al-Marayati, supra note 171, at 324. 
 174. Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 64. OFAC also entered Holy Land’s headquarters, 
without a warrant, and removed “all documents, computers, and furniture.” Id. 
 175. Id.  Holy Land filed a cause of action alleging violations of: (1) the Administrative 
Procedure Act; (2) the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment; (3) the Takings clause of the 
Fifth Amendment; (4) the Fourth Amendment; (5) the First Amendment rights to freedom of 
speech and association; and (6) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Id. See also Klass, supra 
note 169, at 169 (explaining the evidence that Holy Land was linked with Hamas). 
 176. See Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 65–85 (analyzing Holy Land’s various 
claims). 
 177. Id. at 76. 
 178. See id. at 78–80. 
 179. Id. at 76. 
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after seizure d[oes] not deny due process.”180  Turning to the Fourth 
Amendment claim, the court held “blocking of this nature does not constitute a 
seizure.”181  The court reasoned the freezing of accounts was not an unlawful 
seizure because “the Government plainly had the authority to issue the 
blocking order pursuant to the IEEPA and the Executive Orders and the Court 
has determined that its actions were not arbitrary or capricious.”182 
Similar attempts by Muslim charities met with similar results.  For 
example, on October 13, 2004, OFAC designated the Islamic American Relief 
Agency183 (“IARA”) as a SDGT, and blocked the assets of IARA and five of 
its officials.184  Like Holy Land, IARA challenged the action in court alleging 
various constitutional violations, including Due Process and Fourth 
Amendment claims.185  But relying heavily on the Holy Land opinion,186 the 
court ruled in favor of the government.187 
Although successful challenges to a SDGT designation and blocking order 
may be limited, a recent case out of Ohio may offer hope to Muslim charity 
plaintiffs in the future.  The case, KindHearts v. Geithner,188 has been heralded 
as “a victory for all Americans who value the constitutional rights to due 
process and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.”189 
KindHearts is a nonprofit corporation, incorporated under Ohio law, with 
the stated goal to “provide humanitarian aid without regard to religious or 
political affiliation.”190  On February 19, 2006, OFAC, without prior notice, 
issued a blocking order which froze all of KindHearts’ assets pending 
 
 180. Id. at 76–77 (quoting Calero–Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680 
(1974)). 
 181. Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 79. 
 182. Id. at 78. The circuit court affirmed the district court’s decision in 2003.  Holy Land 
Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 183. The Islamic American Relief Agency was based in Columbia, Missouri, and was 
established in 1985 as a nonprofit humanitarian relief organization.  Islamic Am. Relief Agency 
v. Unidentified FBI Agents, 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39–40 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 184. Id. at 40. 
 185. Id. at 39. 
 186. See id. at 47–50 (analyzing IARA’s claims and repeatedly citing Holy Land for support). 
 187. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the lower court decision. Islamic Am. Relief 
Agency v. Gonzalez, 477 F.3d 728, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming district court on other 
grounds). 
 188. See infra notes 192–205, 208–17 and accompanying text. 
 189. Press Release, CAIR, CAIR Welcomes Ruling in Support of Muslim Charity’s Due 
Process Rights (Aug. 19, 2009) (quoting Nahid Awad, CAIR National Executive Director), 
http://www.cair.com/ArticleDetails.aspx?mid1=777&&ArticleID=26061&&name=n&&currPage
=1# (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
 190. KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 864 
(N.D. Ohio 2009). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
936 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:917 
investigation.191  The blocking order “effectively shut the organization 
down”192 by indefinitely freezing all KindHearts’ assets and property, 
“including about one million dollars in bank accounts.”193 
In April 2006, and again in November 2006, KindHearts attempted to 
respond to the block via letter, but received no response from OFAC.194  More 
than a year after the initial block, on May 25, 2007, the OFAC finally 
acknowledged receipt of KindHearts’ April and November correspondence and 
“notified KindHearts that OFAC had provisionally determined to designate 
KindHearts a [SDGT].”195  OFAC never made a final designation as to 
KindHearts status as a SDGT; meanwhile, “[f]or almost three years OFAC has 
blocked KindHearts’ property and property interests and criminalized all 
transactions with it.”196  During those three years, the OFAC “provided no 
explanation of the specific charges it was considering against KindHearts or 
why it thought the evidence supported a potential designation.”197  Moreover, 
the OFAC restricted KindHearts access to its own documents needed to rebut 
OFAC claims as well as funds to pay for legal counsel.198 
KindHearts alleged OFAC’s actions were unconstitutional for a number of 
reasons, including that the actions amounted to a Fourth Amendment violation 
for unreasonable seizure, as well as a violation of due process.199  Rather than 
dismissing the Fourth Amendment claim by relying on precedent, the court 
declined to follow the Holy Land and IARA holdings.200  The court concluded 
these prior cases had erroneously applied a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
analysis to the OFAC blocking actions, rather than the “lower threshold” of a 
 
 191. Id. at 865.  The Treasury Department also issued a press release on its website 
announcing the block for alleged affiliations with Hamas.  Id. at 867. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., 647 F. Supp. 2d at 867. 
 196. Id. at 870. 
 197. Id. at 868. 
 198. Id. at 868–69. 
 199. Id. at 864 
 KindHearts alleges that OFAC’s actions are unconstitutional because: 1) OFAC’s 
block is an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; 2) provisions 
authorizing OFAC to designate SDGT and block assets pending investigation are void for 
vagueness under the Fifth Amendment; 3) OFAC denied KindHearts procedural due 
process before provisionally determining it to be an SDGT and blocking its assets; and 4) 
OFAC has unconstitutionally restricted plaintiff’s access to the resources it needs to 
mount a defense. KindHearts further claims that OFAC blocked KindHearts’ assets 
without proper statutory authorization. 
Id. 
 200. See KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., 647 F. Supp. 2d at 871–72. 
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Fourth Amendment seizure analysis.201  The court reasoned that because the 
OFAC blocking actions interfere with possessory rights, and are not 
necessarily a permanent deprivation, they are properly considered a “seizure” 
under the Fourth Amendment.202 
But the government argued OFAC blocking actions should be excluded 
from Fourth Amendment scrutiny because: (1) historically, the Fourth 
Amendment has not been applied to blocking actions; and (2) deference should 
be given to the President regarding foreign affairs.203  In rejecting the 
government’s first contention, the court noted none of the prior TWEA204 and 
IEEPA205 cases asserted a Fourth Amendment interest, as they involved 
economic sanctions on foreign governments.206  In contrast, the court reasoned: 
 KindHearts’ situation differs strikingly and significantly from that of the 
foreign governments and foreign assets at issue in the TWEA and IEEPA cases 
on which the government relies . . . . 
 KindHearts is indisputably one of “the people” protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.  If the Constitution affords KindHearts no protection from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, whom among “the people” does it protect 
and who among the people can be certain of its protection?207 
In addressing the historical argument advanced by the government, the 
court acknowledged “compelling parallels between the instant case and the 
colonial-era activities inspiring the Founders to include the Fourth Amendment 
in our fundamental charter of liberties.”208  The court completely dismissed the 
government’s first assertion by stating, “[t]o find the Fourth Amendment 
inapplicable to OFAC blocking actions would disregard the Amendment’s 
history and its role as a bulwark against the abuses and excesses of unchecked 
governmental power.”209 
 
 201. Id. at 872. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 872–73. 
 204. Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65–91, 40 Stat. 411 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–44 (2006)).  “During wartime, TWEA both made it a crime to 
engage in specified forms of commerce with America’s enemies, and delegated to the President 
the power to regulate or prohibit a variety of other economic transactions with both enemies and 
allies.”  Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of 
Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 4 (2005). 
 205. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–07 (2006).  The 
IEEPA was an attempt to improve upon the TWEA by specifying the President can invoke 
IEEPA powers only in limited circumstances and “authorizes the President to impose whole or 
partial economic embargoes during emergencies.”  Chesney, supra note 204, at 5. 
 206. KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., 647 F. Supp. 2d at 873. 
 207. Id. at 874. 
 208. Id. at 874–76 (discussing the colonial era struggles with government as reason to include 
the Fourth Amendment in the Constitution). 
 209. Id. at 876. 
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The court also disagreed with the government’s second argument that 
deference should be given to the executive on matters regarding foreign 
affairs.210  The court reasoned that “[l]egislation cannot authorize the President 
to ignore the Bill of Rights.  Under the Fourth Amendment, the federal 
government ‘as an undivided whole’ lacks entirely the power to conduct 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”211  Finding no “special needs” or exigent 
circumstances that would excuse the general warrant and probable cause 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that the OFAC 
block constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.212 
Turning to KindHearts’ Due Process challenge, the court concluded “the 
government’s actions regarding the blocking order failed to provide the two 
fundamental requirements of due process: meaningful notice and opportunity 
to be heard.”213  The court characterized the “notice”214 given to KindHearts as 
“piecemeal and partial”215 leaving the organization “largely uninformed about 
the basis for government’s actions.”216  The court applied the three-factor 
Mathews217 test to the notice given by OFAC and held “consideration of the 
Mathews factors leads inescapably to the conclusion that OFAC violated 
KindHearts’ fundamental right to be told on what basis and for what reasons 
the government deprived it of all access to all its assets and shutdown its 
operations.”218  The court also held OFAC’s lengthy and repeated delays in 
responding to KindHearts violated the “due process requirement of prompt 
post-deprivation hearing.”219  This decision, with its strong language and 
reasoning, serves as a significant victory for American Muslim charities as it 
upheld constitutional protections afforded all Americans, and curtailed the 
government’s unfettered discretion in these types of cases. 
 
 210. See id. at 876–78. 
 211. KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., 647 F. Supp. 2d at 877 (emphasis 
removed). 
 212. See id. at 789–882 (discussing exceptions to probable cause and warrant requirements). 
 213. Id. at 897.  The court however, found it could not presently determine the extent to 
which KindHearts had been prejudiced by the violation if its constitutional rights and that the due 
process challenge to the provisional SDGT designation is not ripe for adjudication.  Id. at 908–10. 
 214. The notice given was summarized as “the letter KindHearts received informing it of the 
government’s decision, the thirty-five unclassified, non-privileged exhibits, and a redacted 
version of the provisional determination evidentiary memo.” Id. at 904. 
 215. Id. at 901. 
 216. Id. at 904. 
 217. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  In applying the test, courts must weigh: 
“First, the private interest . . . affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used . . . ; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that . . . 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”  Id. at 335. 
 218. KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., 647 F. Supp. 2d at 904. 
 219. Id. at 906–08. 
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IV.  Learning from This Litigation 
Understandably, the United States underwent a dramatic political shift 
after the 9/11 attacks; but American Muslim litigants are working to keep those 
attacks from giving the government free reign to disregard basic civil rights in 
this country.  As Judge Montgomery points out in the Shqeirat case “[W]hen a 
law enforcement officer exercises the power of the [s]overeign over its 
citizens, she or he has a responsibility to operate within the bounds of the 
Constitution and cannot raise the spector of 9/11 as an absolute exception to 
that responsibility.”220  In the Shqeirat case, Judge Montgomery reminds law 
enforcement and others that “[p]raying in public, commenting on current 
events, and even criticizing governmental policy is protected speech under the 
First Amendment.”221  Further, she emphasized that this is as true for Muslims 
and people of Middle Eastern descent as it is for Russian Orthodox priests or 
Franciscan monks.222  Judge Montgomery suggests that if the government 
defendants in the Shqeirat case had only educated themselves, however briefly, 
about the exact situation of the Imams praying before entering the plane, they 
would have plainly seen the lack of probable cause for their detention.223 
Sadly, for many American Muslims—particularly those challenging 
blocking orders used to essentially shut down American Muslim charities 
allegedly thought to be terrorist organizations—Judge Montgomery’s 
comments fall on deaf ears.224  As can be seen from the Holy Land and IARA 
decisions, those courts chose to approve of the government’s actions with 
respect to the blocking order because they found no Due Process violation, as 
well as no unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment.225 
Judge Carr in the KindHearts decision, however, took the Holy Land and 
IARA cases and decisions head on, finding that in fact the government did 
violate the Fourth Amendment in its use of the blocking order against 
KindHearts.226  Specifically, as Judge Carr stated, “Kindhearts is indisputably 
 
 220. Shqeirat v. U.S. Airways, 645 F. Supp. 765, 788 (D.Minn. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 221. Id. at 786. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See supra, Part IV.  Muslims have responded to the blocking orders in court, but also on 
a more practical level.  A Muslim group called Muslim Advocates has started its own 
accreditation for Muslim charities.  See Press Release, Muslim Advocates, First American 
Charities Accredited Through Ground Breaking Program (Aug. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.muslimadvocates.org/documents/MCAP1_rls.pdf; Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Muslim 
Charities Learn Transparency, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 2009;  Jeff Karoub & David Grant, Listing 
Clears Cloud Over Islamic Charities, CHI. TRIB., Sep. 20, 2009. 
 225. Id. 
 226. KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev. v. Geithner, 2009 WL 2514057, at *17–21 
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 2009). 
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one of the people protected by the Fourth Amendment.”227  Here, like Judge 
Montgomery, we see a district court refusing to grant the government 
unfettered power, and reminding the government that it owes constitutional 
rights and protections to its citizens and organizations.  Despite the losses in 
Holy Land and IARA decisions, the court in KindHearts reminds us, very 
directly, “If the Constitution affords Kindhearts no protection from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, whom among ‘the people’ does it protect 
and whom among the people can be certain of its protections.”228  After years 
of delay, this Muslim American organization was finally able to receive the 
relief it sought—protection of its civil and constitutional rights.   
This and the few recent victories discussed in this article, however, do not 
significantly alter the present challenging reality of Muslims in America. 
 Along with fear over the present and future status of their civil rights, there is 
also a large degree of frustration among U.S. Muslims.  The frustration 
involves what is actually a constant struggle against a type of civic blackmail 
which demands Muslims in the U.S. to be utterly compliant, or run the risk of 
having their patriotism called into question. As a result there is a certain pall of 
silence that has been cast over the community.229 
Many American Muslims do not feel free to express themselves in a public 
setting,230 much less in a court room.  While young American Muslims have 
become increasingly more active in American politics and society as a whole, 
“the vast majority of U.S. Muslims are simply trying to keep beneath the radar 
screen. They are understandably not asking questions and not challenging 
assumptions for fear of government reprisals.”231  Those that do may face 
courts and judges who are willing to struggle to find the proper balance 
between the protections of civil rights and the exercise of government and 
police powers.  This balance may or may not tip in their favor, as American 
Muslims saw in the Webb case.232  While more judges appear willing, contrary 
to Judge Montgomery’s decision, to use 9/11 as a blanket justification for 
whatever action the government chooses to take,233 American Muslims have to 
continue to challenge this discrimination in court in hopes that the Constitution 
and the rule of law will prevail.  Over time, with a succession of legal victories 
 
 227. Id. at 11. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Scott Alexander, Inalienable Rights? Muslims in the U.S. Since September 11th, 7 J. 
ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 103, 119 (2002). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 119–20 
 232. See Webb v. Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256 (3rd Cir. 2009). 
 233. See, e.g., Dasrath v. Cont’l Airlines, 228 F.Supp.2d 531, 540 (D.N.J. 2002) (“In this case 
Plaintiffs’ burden will be a heavy one considering the heightened actual dangers arising from the 
increased risk of terrorist acts . . . .”). 
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and judicial support for American Muslims’ civil rights, the fear and 
frustration they experience may begin to subside. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The future of these cases and the future of American Muslims’ civil rights 
in post-9/11 America is still uncertain.  What is certain, however, is that 
American Muslims can no longer afford the image that they are isolationists 
and removed from everyday civil rights struggles.  While certain cases 
discussed in this Article have brought about some successful results and 
possibly further tolerance and understanding, the civil rights battles continue 
and American Muslims appear more prepared than ever to fight for these rights 
in court.  Of course, these Muslims are not just fighting for their own rights, 
but the rights of all Americans.  Just like so many immigrants and religious 
minorities before them, American Muslims are asserting themselves in an 
important part of American society, one civil rights case at a time. 
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